Recently, active institutional investors and shareholder activists have sharply criticized various features of stock option programs. These groups argue that the design of many stock option programs is an example of managerial self-dealing and rent extraction and illustrates the inability of existing corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring executives. It is uncontroversial that managers possess significant control rights and it is well documented that they use their discretion in firms to benefit themselves personally in various ways. Governance mechanisms like monitoring by boards of directors or blockholders are designed to mitigate these agency costs. There is increasing evidence that features of employee stock option (ESO) plans can be seen as evidence consistent with managers extracting rents from option granting firms. We investigate whether there is an association between the design of ESO programs and the quality of a firm's corporate governance. Simply put, we examine whether firms with weak governance schemes have stock option programs that are "poorly" designed from an economic point of view. Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find that cross-sectionally, ownership variables seem to be related to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the managerial power or rent-extraction view. When ownership concentration is low and the exposition to the U.S. capital market little, executives can extract rents by designing poor ESO programs. Further support for this view is provided by the finding that firms with weaker creditor rights more often have badly designed stock option plans. Our findings, however, also suggest that ineffective board structures do not seem to be associated with the stock option design in a way that supports the arguments and predication of the self-dealing view.
Introduction
Recently, active institutional investors and shareholder activists have sharply criticized various features of stock option programs. These groups argue that the design of many stock option programs is an example of managerial self-dealing and rent extraction and illustrates the inability of existing corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring executives. Even in the academic press, there is an increasing criticism saying that the escalation and design of stock option compensation reflects managerial rent seeking rather than optimal contracting. Bebchuk and Fried (2003, 2004) and Bebchuk et al. (2002) , for example, argue that managers exercise their influence to maximize wealth transfers with stock options. In their viewpoint, executive compensation reflects agency problems rather than solving them and weak corporate governance structures lead to an inefficient stock option design. Bebchuk and Fried and Bebckuk et al. argue that features of stock option plans like no indexing to market movements, exercise prices that equal market prices at grant dates and option repricing activity can be seen as evidence consistent with this kind of rent seeking.
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They claim that the greater a manager's power (i.e. the weaker the governance system), the greater his ability to extract rents by influencing executive pay ("managerial power approach").
2
Managers possess significant control rights and it is well documented that they use their discretion in firms to benefit themselves personally in various ways (by expropriating funds, empire building, consumption of perquisites, no cash-out of free cash flow and by entrenching themselves in positions that make it difficult to displace them when they perform badly).
3
Moreover, there is no doubt that managers have at least some influence on the level, structure and design of their compensation packages. As pointed out by Murphy (1999) , the process in which the structure and design of compensation schemes is developed is likely to be exposed to managerial power. Usually, initial recommendations for incentive plans are developed by the internal human resources departments and not 1 See also Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) for an exposition of a contracting view vis-a-vis a skimming view of executive compensation.
2 Hall and Murphy (2003) contradict this hypothesis by claiming that managerial rent extraction provides, at best, an explanation for the compensation of top executives. They believe that governance structures have improved in the past preventing the extraction of rents by corporate officers.
by independent advisors.
4
Moreover, compensation recommendations usually need the approval of top managers before being passed to the compensation committee and managers can therefore influence the proposal in their own interests.
Following this line of argument, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) state that recent empirical research "... suggests that the process of determining compensation is better described as a negotiation process between the board and the CEO" rather than by an optimal contracting approach.
5
It is therefore evident to ask to what extend the design of stock option programs is determined by variables influencing the bargaining process (like the structure and composition of the board, the existence of blockholder, etc.). Nevertheless, it is still an open and unanswered question whether the design of employee stock option (ESO) programs is indeed affected by the ownership of a firm's stock and by the structure and composition of its board of directors.
Recent research in the field of corporate finance suggests that inside board members, large boards, busy board chairmen, CEOs who also chair the board or the absence of monitoring blockholders result in less effective monitoring and in a weak corporate governance.
Based on this work, we want to investigate whether there is an association between the design of employee stock option programs and the structure of a firm's corporate governance. We try to explain the observed variation in the design of ESO programs with differences in firms' corporate governance schemes. Simply put, we examine whether firms with weak governance schemes have stock option programs that are poorly designed from an economic or agency theoretic point of view.
To perform this task, data on European stock option programs provides a promising basis.
Due to accounting and tax regulations, the variation in the design of ESO programs for U.S. firms is rather limited compared to European firms (see Pasternack and Rosenberg, 2003 or Murphy, 1999) . U.S. firms, for example, usually do not use performance-based ESO programs.
6
Our data on European stock option programs therefore provides the op-4 Even if outside compensation consultants are involved, it is unlikely that they work independently since their fees depend on the companies mandates.
5 Ryan and Wiggins (2004) , p. 498.
6 ESO Programs without performance conditions were treated preferably according to FASB accounting rules, see Bebchuk et al. (2003).? portunity to test the importance of governance structures for the design of ESO plans.
European stock option plans show large variations and therefore provide a natural environment for an attempt to test the managerial power or rent-seeking approach described above.
We analyze the association between the stock option program design and corporate governance by using detailed data on the ESO programs of 80 corporations belonging to the DAX 30, the Euro Stoxx 50 and the Stoxx 50. Our data set includes information on five core variables of the programs: relative and absolute performance requirements, accounting treatments, participation structures and the transparency of the respective programs. We combine this data set with hand-collected data on the governance structures of the included firms. Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find that cross-sectionally, ownership variables seem to be related to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the managerial power or rent-extraction view. When ownership concentration is low and the exposition to the U.S. capital market little, executives can extract rents by designing poor ESO programs. Our evidence on the role of blockholders in exercising monitoring and control complements evidence of other studies in the field documenting that large shareholders play an active role in corporate governance. Further support for this view is provided by the finding that firms with weaker creditor rights more often have badly designed stock option plans. Our findings, however, also suggest that ineffective board structures do not seem to be associated with the stock option design in a way that supports the arguments and predication of the self-dealing view.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the existing literature that links corporate governance and executive compensation. Section 3 derives benchmarks for the optimal design of stock option programs based on economic theory and states the hypothesis we want to investigate. Section 4 presents the data sets and variables and provides an exposition of the empirical methodology employed. Section 5 presents the empirical results on the design of the studied option programs and its association with the firms' corporate governance structures. It also presents an interpretation and discussion of the results. The last section summarizes the findings and concludes.
Several empirical papers have examined the relation between corporate governance structures and various aspects of executive compensation.
Some studies have examined whether there is an association between the level of compensation and governance structures. Core et al. (1999) , for example, use a sample with CEO compensation data of 205 publicly traded U.S. firms over a three year period. They examine the relation between corporate governance (proxied by board and ownership variables) and CEO compensation to test whether CEOs earn greater compensation when corporate governance structures are less effective. Controlling for economic determinants of compensation, they find that the level of CEO pay is increasing in board size, the percentage of outsiders who are gray (outsiders that receive money from the company in excess of the board pay), the percentage of outside directors who are over age 69, and the percentage of outsiders who serve on three or more boards. Moreover, they find that chief executive compensation is lower if the CEO does not serve as the board chair, if he holds a larger fraction of company stock and if there exists an external blockholder who owns at least 5%. Overall, Core et al. conclude that "... CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective." Their findings suggest that CEOs get higher salaries when they have appointed a larger fraction of the board members and that the existence of a large external blockholder is negatively related to the level of executive compensation. They argue that their "... results provide support for the importance of managerial power in explaining levels of executive compensation".
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Supporting this view, Boyd (1994) finds that CEO salaries were lower in corporations with higher levels of control.
Other empirical research examines whether corporate governance structures affect the pay-for-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Hartzell and Starks (2003) , for example, find that institutional shareholding concentration and the pay-for-performance 7 Core et al. (1999) , p. 371.
8 Lambert et al. (1993), p. 457. sensitivity of executive compensation are strongly positively related. They show that for an average executive, an increase of one standard deviation in the percentage of institutional ownership by the five largest shareholders is associated with an estimated 20% increase in the sensitivity of option grants to stock price changes. Additionally, they find that institutional ownership concentration is negatively related to the overall level of compensation (after controlling for economic determinants of the level of compensation). In a recent paper, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find that powerful CEOs use their position to influence the compensation of directors in a way to provide fewer monitoring incentives.
Furthermore, they influence their own pay such that it becomes less sensitive to stock price performance. Newman and Mozes (1999) provide additional evidence suggesting that compensation practices are more likely to be consistent with managerial self-dealing than with optimal contracting. They document that when insiders are members of compensation committees, CEOs receive preferential treatment. Harvey and Shrieves (2001) document a relationship between ownership and board variables on the one hand and the use of incentive compensation on the other hand. Incentive compensation is more pronounced in firms with a larger fraction of outsiders on the board and in firms where blockholders are present. Similar results are provided by Mehran (1995) . He examines the relationship between executive compensation structure and ownership variables of 153 firms. Mehran finds that companies with more outside directors provide a higher fraction of their executive compensation in an equity-based form. Consistent with the conjecture that blockholders mitigate agency problems by monitoring board activities, he finds that in firms with a higher percentage of the shares held by outside blockholders, equity-compensation is used less heavily. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) find that "... better governed firms pay their CEO less for luck" (windfall profits) and in a related paper that CEOs in better governed firms are charged more for the options they are given (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2000) . Bertrand and Mullainathan conclude that their results can not be explained with a simple contracting view. They argue that their results are better explained by a view where CEOs exercise effective power over the pay-setting process.
Additional evidence for a relationship between compensation practices and governance structures is provided by Yermack (1997) . He studies the timing of stock option grants and finds that CEOs receive stock options shortly prior to the release of good news.
Since stock options are usually granted with a strike price equal to the stock price on the grant date, CEOs effectively receive in-the-money options by making grants before good news. Managers compensation and wealth hence increases by reasons that are unrelated to managerial ability, effort or performance. He finds that the difference between the stock price 30 days after grant and the strike price at the grant day is higher for firms with weaker corporate governance. Similar evidence is provided by Aboody and Kasznik (2000) .
Other studies have examined the association between ownership/board structures and the repricing of stock options.
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Some authors provide evidence that option repricing reflects governance problems. Chance et al. (2000) find that insider-dominated boards are more likely to reprice stock options in a way favorable to managers suggesting managerial entrenchment and self-serving behavior. Similarly, Brenner et al. (2000) show that the attendance of executives in the compensation committee increases the likelihood of option repricing. Moreover, managers tend to time the repricing decision to increase their option values. Callaghan et al. (2004) document that this kind of timing is "... more likely in firms with weak corporate governance".
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The study that is most closely related to our work is a paper by Pasternack and Rosenberg (2003) . They study determinants of the scope of stock option plans, exercise prices, target groups, and of dividend protection clauses using a sample of Finnish firms. Their results suggest that firms with bigger monitoring difficulties use more equity incentives 11 but that there is no association between their incentive measure and ownership structures.
In a similar vein, the exercise prices of options also seems to be unrelated to ownership variables. Their results, however, suggest that institutional ownership increases the likelihood that a broad-based option plan is used and that the degree of foreign stock owners 9 Repricing means the lowering of strike prices of previously granted stock options that are significantly out-of-the-money.
The new strike prices are often 30-40% below the old strike prices (Chidambaran and Prabhala, 2003) Chidambaran and Prabhala (2003) who study the relation between option repricing and, apart from other variables, diffuse stock ownership and institutional ownership. Similarly, Carter and Lynch (2001) find no evidence that the likelihood of repricing is related to governance problems.
11 Measured as the stock option overhang, i.e. the fraction of equity that is obtained if all granted options are exercised.
reduces the likelihood of dividend protection mechanisms in ESO plans.
Overall, the empirical evidence suggests that corporate governance schemes affect various aspects of executive compensation such as the level of compensation, its sensitivity to firm performance, the fraction of pay that is equity-based as well as the process of option repricing.
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However, the relation between the design of stock option programs and governance schemes is much less explored and less conclusive. The goal of our paper is to extend the existing literature by examining the important link between corporate governance schemes and the design of stock option programs.
Economic Theory and Hypothesis
Before turning to the predications on the relationship between corporate governance and the design of stock option programs, we want to set fourth what economic theory tells us about the "optimal" design of stock option programs. Stock option programs evolved as a solution or at least mitigation of the agency problem caused by the separation of ownership and control (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . It is uncontroversial that equitybased compensation, if well designed, provides effective incentives to managers.
Agency theory predicts that managers should be awarded for outcomes over which they have control and which are informative about the actions taken by managers (see Holmström, 1979 Holmström, , 1982 . Stock prices provide information about the actions taken by managers.
However, stock prices are noisy measures of executives performance. Efficient compensation contracts should therefore filter out stock price changes that are due to general market trends (windfall profits) and hence unrelated to managers' performance. Therefore, from an optimal contracting point of view, incentive pay should be tied to performance relative to comparable firms or competitors and not to absolute performance as such (the so-called relative performance evaluation developed in Holmström, 1982) . A relative performance evaluation can therefore be regarded as a way to take out the noise of stock price movements (see Murphy, 1999) . To filter out general industry or market trends in practice, 12 For more general expositions on related corporate governance issues, see La Porta et al. (1998 , 1999 , Vishny (1986, 1997) , Gompers et al. (2003) , Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) , Holderness, 2003 , Weisbach (1988 , Becht et al. (2003) .
the vesting of stock options can be made dependent on the meeting of specific relative performance targets.
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More specifically, a stock option plan could be constructed such that options become exercisable only if the stock price of the company outperforms a benchmark index consisting of the main competitors in the industry. 14 A stock option plan without any absolute performance target is, however, likewise problematic. In particular, option exercises should be made depended on the firm obtaining a minimum stock return exceeding, for example, the risk-free rate of interest or the firmspecific cost of capital. In the absence of absolute return targets, managers might cash in money by exercising options even though a stock investment in the firm did not perform better than risk-free investment. Institutional investors and shareholder activists therefore regularly demand stock options programs that contain at least some absolute performance goal. If stock option plans include absolute performance targets, incentive effects become the more pronounced the more ambitious required absolute returns are set.
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Proper stock option plans should hence include some stock return thresholds that are required to be met before options become exercisable.
16
From an economic point of view, stock options constitute economic costs to the issuing companies and should therefore be expensed. The cost of a stock option to a granting company is the amount an outside investor would pay for the option at the date of grant, assuming that the outside investor shows exercise and forfeiture patterns that are identical to those of inside employees. However, in practice, there used to be no legal requirement for the accounting of stock option plans and many firms were reluctant to expense the costs of ESO plans in their accounts. Under Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion 25, firms that have set the strike price of their options equal to the stock price at the date of grant, did not have to expense the costs of their option programs. Instead, they had to disclose an estimate of the value of the program in a footnote. Financial Accounting 13 Bebchuk and Fried (2003) call this kind of ESO plans "reduced-windfall" plans. Alternatively, exercise prices of stock options can be linked to market or sector indices.
14 In the U.S., most stock option plans fail to include relative performance targets or indexed exercise prices (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2003) . In Europe, this is different, as we will show below.
15 At least up to a certain point. 16 Since this argument is questionable from an agency theoretic point of view, we also performed the analysis in Chapter 5 with the exclusion of this design feature. It turned out that the results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of an absolute performance target in the analysis.
Standard (FAS) 123, issued in 1995, recommended that firms treat stock option programs as an accounting expense and advised firms to use the "fair market value" of the options granted as estimate for the cost of the ESO plan. However, since FAS 123 provided firms with the option to continue reporting according to the older APB 25, only few firms adopted the economically correct new FAS approach (see Hall and Murphy, 2003) .
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Several authors emphasize the economic importance of expensing employee stock options. Guay et al. (2003) , for example, argue that "... accounting should reflect the true costs of doing business, and labor acquired through ESO grants is a real economic cost that firms should deduct from earnings as an expense."
18 Moreover, they expose that accounting for ESOs leads to a more efficient functioning of the economic system.
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Guay et al. (2003) hypothesize that better governed firms would expense their options and empirical evidence by Dechow et al. (1996) suggests that managers from firms lobbying against the FASB drafts to expense options received both higher total compensation and a higher fraction of compensation in options.
Agency theory provides a rationale why it makes sense to link top-manager compensation via stock options to company performance. It is, however, less clear why managers at lower levels in a firm should participate in costly stock option programs. On an individual basis, lower-level employees usually have a significantly small impact on firm performance and Hall and Murphy (2003) argues that "... it seems implausible that stock options provide meaningful incentives to lower-level employees".
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The lower the level in an organization, the less informative is the stock price about the actions takes by individuals. Alternative measures of performance (e.g. divisional profits) therefore provide much more efficient ways to boost incentives at lower grades. In a similar vein, Oyer and Schaefer (2004) find that stock options for middle-level managers are a very inefficient way of providing incentives.
21
Following this argument, well-designed ESO plans should only include a limited amount of employees (top-managers) whose efforts can have a significant impact on firm value and firm performance. The literature on the relationship between corporate governance and executive compensation cited in Section 2 and the economic theory on designing optimal ESO programs presented above suggests the following hypothesis that we want to test empirically.
ESOP rogramDesign = f (CorporateGovernanceV ariables, ControlV ariables) (1)
Our null hypothesis is that firms with weaker corporate governance structures have worse designed stock option programs. Under this null hypothesis, managers extract rents and behave opportunistically by designing option programs that are inconsistent with the recommendations made by agency theory if governance structures are ineffective and weak.
We test this hypothesis cross-sectionally using the data described in the next Subsection. The variable we use to measure the quality of a firms governance are presented in Subsection 4.2. The econometric specification employed to test the relationship between corporate governance and the design of stock option programs is described in Subsection 4.3.
22 See Oyer and Schaefer (2004) , Zhang (2002) or Bergman and Jenter (2003) for arguments why firms might use broadbased ESO plans. The combined initial data set consists of 89 firms. Eight firms were dropped because they abandoned or stopped their stock option programs in 2003 and one firm was excluded because of missing data. The final sample used for studying the association between the design of the ESO programs and corporate governance therefore consists of 80 corporations. If company specific benchmarks exist, the grade depends on an individual evaluation. Absolute Performance Target G 2j is a variable that measures the absolute stock return that is required before options become exercisable. It takes the value G 2j = 1 if the absolute performance target is larger than 8% p.a., G 2j = 2 if it is between 6% and 8% p.a., G 2j = 3 if it is between 4% and 6% p.a., G 2j = 4 if it is between 2% and 4% p.a. and G 2j = 5 if it is smaller than 2% p.a.
Measurement of Variables

25
Accounting reflects to what extend a firm expenses the economic costs of its stock option program. It takes the value G 3j = 1 if a fair value accounting approach is used (like IFRS 2, SFAS 123 expensed or SFAS 148), G 3j = 2 if a market-to-market approach is employed (the intrinsic value is expensed), G 3j = 3 or 4 if the APB 25 methodology is used (disclosure in the footnote only) and G 3j = 5 if the stock option program is dilutive (no disclosure or expense at all). Participation Structure G 4j depicts the broadness of a firm's stock option plan. It takes the value G 4j = 1 if the program is well defined and of small size, G 5j = 2 if it is of medium size and G 5j = 3 if it is very vague and very broad-based. Transparency G 5j reflects the degree of transparency and the possibility for an external evaluation of a company's ESO plan. It takes the value G 5j = 1 if the program is very transparent to shareholders and investors, G 5j = 2 if it is only partly transparent and G 5j = 3 if it severely lacks of transparency.
Having graded each of the five program features, we evaluate the overall design of a firms stock option programs by aggregating the grades of the subindexes into a firmspecific overall ESO Grade Index (abbreviated G j ). The construction of this index is 24 Whether a 1 or 2 (3 or 4) was given depends on the precise construction and the institutional design of the respective program feature. The same applies for the following subindexes if more than one grade is given.
25 Hereby, the moneyness of the options at the grant date is taken into account. straightforward and follows the methodology employed in Gompers et al. (2003) : for each firm we add the grades of the subindexes into an overall grade of the respective program. Therefore, the ESO Grade Index for a certain company j is given by G j = 5 i=1 G ij and G j ranges between 5 and 21.
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While this index is very simple by nature, it has the advantage of being transparent and easily reproducible. In the remainder of the paper, we call a stock option program "well designed" if the ESO Program Grade Index G j is low (G j ≤ 11) and "badly designed" if G j is very high (G j > 15).
Corporate Governance Data: We use measures from three different areas to reflect the corporate governance structures of firms: (1) ownership variables, (2) board variables, and (3) country variables. We employ five measures for the ownership structure of a firm.
To reflect the exposure of a corporation to the U.S. capital market with its disclosure and governance requirements we use a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation is listed at the New York Stock Exchange. Based on the findings presented in Chapter 2 (e.g. the study by Hartzell and Starks, 2003) , we believe that ownership structures influence the design of stock option programs. Therefore, we measure whether or not a firm is owned by an entity that holds more than 5% of its equity.
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We also count the number of blockholders with interests above 5%. Following, for example, Mehran (1995) , we calculate the percentage of equity that is held by outside blockholders. Therefore, we sum the percentages of equity owned by individuals investors, institutional investors, corporations, families or governments that hold more than 5% of the common stock of a firm. Finally, government ownership is measured by a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the state government or a government-owned institution holds a stake larger than 5% in the firm, and 0 otherwise.
We employ six measures for the structure and composition of the board of directors of a firm. To take into account the heterogeneity in the European board systems, we use a dummy variable that takes the value one if a firm has a unitarian one-tier board system 26 We are aware that the fact that two subindexes range only between 1 and 3 (while the others range between 1 and 5) implies an implicit weighting of the subindexes. However, we believe that this weighting is appropriate from an economic point of view. We believe that the participation structures and the transparencies of the ESO programs are relatively less important for a testing of the rent-extraction hypothesis than the other three design features. Nevertheless, we tested whether our results are sensitive to this kind of weighting and found that this seems not to be the case (see Subsection 5.4).
27 If equity holdings and voting rights differ, we use a blockholder's voting rights.
with executive and non-executive directors on the same board (like in Spain or in the United kingdom). Similarly, this dummy takes the value 0 if a corporation is governed by a two-tier system consisting of a supervisory board on the one hand and an executive board on the other hand (like in Germany or in the Netherlands). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) , among others, argue that large boards of directors are less effective as monitors than small boards. Supporting this argument, recent empirical evidence suggests that small boards of directors perform better monitoring and are associated with better decisions and superior firm performance (see, e.g., Yermack, 1996 , Eisenberg et al., 1998 and Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 . We therefore also consider the size of the board and its association with the ESO design. We measured board size as the total number of director on the board (one-tier system) or on the supervisory board (two-tier system). Recent discussions on corporate governance schemes in Europe stress the importance of independent outside directors for the functioning of an effective governance in firms. In this vein, several studies show that firms with a higher fraction of outsiders make better decisions on issues like executive compensation, CEO turnover, acquisition etc. (see, e.g. Core et al., 1999 , Borokhovich et al., 1996 or Weisbach, 1988 .
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To account for effects due to independent outside directors, we measure the fraction of independent outside directors to the total number of directors. We define outside directors as members of the board that are neither executives, retired executives, former executives, employees or union activists.
Chairmen that also serve as CEOs or that used to work in this position (like it is often the case in Germany) are likely to monitor less independently and effectively because of conflicts of interest. We therefore use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the chairman of the board is also CEO (one-tier system) or used to have this position (two-tier system). Core et al. (1999) argue that "... outside directors may become less effective as they grow older or serve on 'too many' boards."
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Following this conjecture and following other researchers in the field, we therefore ascertain the age of the chairman and the number of companies where he is also serving on the board or in a corresponding body.
28 Nevertheless, there seems to be no association between the fraction of outside directors and firm performance, see Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a survey on this literature. Outside blockholder owns >5% Binary variable that takes the value 1 if an outside blockholders holds more than 5%; and 0 otherwise.
Number of outside blockholder >5% Number of outside blockholder that own more than 5%.
Sum percentages outside blockholders >5% Sum of the stockholdings of blockholders that own more than 5%. Government ownership Binary variable that equals 1 if the a government or government-owned institution holds more than 5%; and 0 otherwise.
Board variables
Board structure Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation has a one-tier, unitarian board system; and 0 otherwise.
Board size Total number of members on the supervisory board or on the board of directors.
Outside directors Percentage of outside directors on the board or supervisory board (defined as being neither a top executive, retired executive, former executive, employees or union activists).
CEO = Chairman
Binary variable variable that takes the value 1 if the board chair is also CEO or if he used to be the CEO; and 0 otherwise.
Age chairman
Age of the chairman.
Busy chairman Number of companies where the chairman serves on the board.
Country variables
English law country Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation is incorporated in an English law country (see La Porta et al.,1998) French law country Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation is incorporated in a French law country (see La Porta et al.,1998) German law country Binary variable that takes the value 1 if a corporation is incorporated in a German law country (see La Porta et al.,1998) Creditor rights Creditor rights based on an index that aggregates different creditor rights (see La Porta et al., 1998) A third set of corporate governance variables tries to capture differences in the legal systems among the various European countries and in the respective creditor rights (how strong bondholders and banks are protected). We employ three dummy variables, one to account that a firm is incorporated in a country with English-origin law (e.g. United Kingdom), one for a French-origin law country (e.g. France, Italy, Netherlands and Spain), and one for a German-origin law country (e.g. Germany and Switzerland). We use the classification reported in La Porta et al. (1998) as the data source. To measure creditor rights we also use the data in La Porta et al. (1998) . They use an index ranging between zero and four that is the result of an aggregation of various different creditor rights. A higher number of the index is associated with stronger creditor rights in a certain country. Table 1 summarizes the set of governance variables presented above.
Control Variables:
Control variables used to estimate equation (1) are firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, business risk, and past stock returns. The proxy for firm size is the log of the book value of total assets and leverage is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Consistent with the literature, our proxy for growth opportunities is Tobin's Q. Tobins Q is the market value of a firm's securities divided by the replacement costs of its tangible assets. We use the Chung and Pruitt (1994) measure, i.e. the market value of equity, long-term debt, short-term debt, and preferred stock divided by total assets. Following Mehran (1995), we measure business risk by the standard deviation of the percentage change of operating income (sales minus total operating expenses). The latter is measured with annual data ranging from 1998-2003. Stock Return is the annual percentage stock market return over the prior five years. Moreover, we control for industry effects using dummies for the sectors energy, retail, manufacturing and financial services.
Methodology
The null hypothesis of our paper was that firms with weaker governance structures have worse designed stock option programs. To test our null hypothesis, we use ordered response models (ordered logit and ordered probit models).
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The ordered response is a discrete ordered outcome and given by the ESO Grade Index G j . Ordered response models are used 30 See, for example, Wooldridge (2002) or Borooah (2002) .
to exploit the ordinal and ordered character of the index data. The fact that an ESO Grade Index of 15 is worse than an ESO Grade Index of 14 conveys valuable information that we want to make use of. Therefore, an ordered response model is preferred to a multinomial response model. As discussed in Borooah (2002) , not treating a variable as ordered, when in fact it is ordered, can lead to a loss of efficiency. A linear regression approach is not appropriate because we cannot assume that the index categories are equally spaced. A linear regression approach would treat the difference the indexes between, say, 13 and 12 identically to the difference between 12 and 11. In our case, the index realizations are only a ranking without cardinal saying (see Borooah, 2002) . As independent variables, we use the corporate governance variables and the controls on firm characteristics presented in the previous subsection. The coefficients are estimated by maximum likelihood.
An interpretation of the estimation results has to take into account the possibility that corporate governance mechanisms (like concentration of ownership or outsiders on the board) and the design of managerial compensation arise simultaneously and endogenously and depend only on firm characteristics (see Core et al., 1999, Hartzell and Starks, 2003 or Becht et al. (2003) , pp. 76 for a discussion). If firms with weak corporate governance structures have badly-designed stock option programs, there can be at least two explanations: (i) There is no need for high-powered stock option programs and strong governance schemes since agency costs are low or (ii) managers use weak corporate governance and missing monitoring devices for self-dealing (which is consistent with our null hypothesis).
On the other hand, firms with well-designed ESO programs might not experience the need for alternative governance mechanisms like monitoring boards or blockholders to maximize firm value. As a result of these potential methodological difficulties, we do not try to infer causalities out of our findings and concentrate studying whether empirical regularities concerning governance structures and the design of option programs exist. 5 Empirical Results
Sample Characteristics
Summary statistics for a set of characteristics of the firms in our sample are presented in (2.82%) p.a. All currencies were transferred into Euros on the basis of year-end exchange rates.
Governance Structures and Stock Option Design: Descriptive Results
Descriptive statistics for the corporate governance variables are presented in Table 3 .
About 61% of the companies have either common stocks or American Depository Receipts (ADR) that are traded at the New York Stock Exchange. Approximately 64% of all firms have a blockholder that owns more than 5% of a firm's voting rights. This figure is mainly driven by German, French and Italian firms. The mean (median) number of blockholders that own more than 5% is 1.15 (1.00) with a maximum of 7 individual blockholders in one corporation. Ownership structures in our data set are not widely dispersed compared to the U.S. with, on average, 18.67% of the stocks being held by investors that own more than 5% of the respective firm's equity. National government still play a significant role in our sample corporations, with 13.75% having the state or a government-dependent institution as a significant shareholder owning more than 5%.
One-tier and two-tier board systems are about equally distributed in the data set with approximately 48% of the firms having a one-tier system. It is important to note that
French corporations have the choice between an Anglo-American style one-tier system and a German style two-tier system which has been adopted by some firms.
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The average board consists of 13.71 directors, a figure that is close to the one reported in Core et al. (1999) . Board size, however, varies widely with the largest board consisting of 22 directors. On average, boards have about 69% outside directors, ranging from only 25% to 100% outsiders. These figures on board independence reflect recent attempts in Europe to strengthen governance structures by following suggestions made by various national governance committees to increase the number of independent directors.
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However, despite these attempts, many chairmen still work as CEOs (in a one-tier system) or used to be working as CEOs (in a two-tier system). This kind of personal alliance is observed in about 54% of the companies. The oldest chairman in our data set is 79 years old whereas the mean and median age is about 68 years. Chairmen serve, on average, on 3.59 additional boards of directors or supervisory boards. Again, the numbers vary widely (between 0 and 9 additional supervisory mandates).
17.5% of the firms are incorporated in a country with English-common-law origin, 41.25% with French-civil-law origin, 40% with German-civil-law origin, and 1.25% with Scandinavian-law origin. The mean (median) value for our measure of creditor rights is about 2.19 (2.50). Table 4 gives summary statistics for the ESO Grade Index G j and the 5 subindexes.
Recall that the ESO Grade Index is the sum of the 5 subindexes and that G j therefore has a possible range from 5 to 21. Panel A shows that the mean (median) index value 31 French firms have the choice between the traditional unitarian system based on the powerful Président Directeur Générale (PDG) and, alternatively, two-tier system with a supervisory board and an executive board.
32 Examples are the Viénot Committee in France, the Draghi Commission in Italy or the Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex in Germany. all. Interestingly, 67.5% of the firms in our sample have absolute performance targets that require annual stock price increases of below 2%.
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Pearson correlation coefficients between the five subindexes, as well as the significance level of each correlation coefficient (in parentheses) and the number of observations used in calculating the coefficient are presented in Table 5 .
The question that remains after this section is whether the drastic variation in ESO designs is associated with differences in governance structures of the respective firms. In the next subsection, we investigate this issue in more depth. We study whether firms with badly designed stock option programs show certain characteristics with respect to their governance structures.
33 See Winter (2002a,b) for a descriptive study on performance targets of stock option programs in Germany. 
Governance Structures and Stock Option Design: Regression Results
The association between corporate governance structures and stock option design is examined using cross-sectional ordered response models (see Chapter 4). The regression includes the ESO Grade Index G j as the ordered response and the variables on ownership and board structures, as well as country variables and controls as independent variables.
Regression results for the ordered logit and the ordered probit regression are presented in Table 6 . For expositional clarity, the law and industry dummies and the number of blockholders that own more than 5% are not reported in this table. They all turned out to be insignificant. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
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The number of observations is 79.
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The regression results show that firms that are listed at the New York Stock Exchange employ stock option programs that are better designed. European companies that are exposed to the American capital market therefore seem to be less likely to provide rentextraction and self-dealing opportunities to their managers. This result is certainly (at least in part) caused by the public scrutiny and the disclosure requirements (e.g. by the SEC) that result from listings at the New York Stock Exchange.
We further find a negative and significant relation between our measure of the percentage of equity held by blockholders and the ESO Grade Index G j . That is, firms with a higher fraction of blockholders have better designed stock option programs. This finding supports the view that controlling shareholders are important in monitoring managerial compensation and behavior. They seem to put pressure on the management in a way that prevents self-dealing with poorly designed ESO programs. Our evidence on the role of blockholders in exercising corporate governance complements evidence of other studies in the field. Franks and Mayer (2001) , Shivdasani (1993) and others document that large shareholders play an active role in corporate governance.
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With respect to the more specific issue of executive compensation, our finding is in line with other results showing that ownership structures and executive compensation are related in the way that better 34 Note that the magnitude of coefficients in ordered response models does not have a simple interpretation. See, for example, Wooldridge (2002) .
35 One firm was excluded from the data set because of an extreme outlier.
36 For further evidence, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) , Becht et al. (2003) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) . governance structures are associated with higher pay-performance sensitivities and lower managerial compensation (see, e.g., Hartzell and Starks, 2003 and Core et al., 1999) .
The coefficients of the measures of government ownership and board structure turned out to be insignificant.
Compared to the ownership variables discussed above, the board variables provide a much less clear cut picture. If board sizes increase, we would expect that boards have greater coordination problems and hence perform their monitoring less effectively. In our case, we would expect that executives exploit these circumstances by influencing their stock option pay in a way that incentive effects and the overall ESO design are less ambitious.
Contradicting this argument, we find that firms with larger boards more often have well designed stock option programs in use. The coefficient of board size is negative and significant both in the ordered logit and in the ordered probit specification. Contrary to economic intuition, we find no association between the fraction of outsiders on the board and the design of the ESO programs. More specifically, we have no evidence suggesting that a higher percentage of outsiders is generally associated with better ESO programs.
This finding might supplement recent empirical evidence suggesting that the influence of the board composition is less important than usually expected by shareholder activists and the popular press. There is, for example, no clear empirical evidence showing that board composition is systematically related to firm performance in the cross section (see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003 for a survey).
Recent discussion also suggest that chairmen become less effective if they grow older and also serve as CEOs (or used to accommodate this position in a two-tier system). The managerial power approach would suggest that in these cases, executives exercise their influence to extract rents. Contrary to this view, we find no empirical evidence showing that stock option programs are more badly designed if these conflicts of interest arise.
Moreover, we find no conclusive results on the association between the ESO design and the variable measuring on how many other boards the chairman serves. Opposed to weak ownership structures, ineffective board structures therefore do not seem be associated with badly designed ESO programs.
Further support for the view that some governance structures and managerial self-dealing are related is provided by the coefficient of the creditor rights variable. We find that firms with greater creditor rights employ ESO programs that are more consistent with the recommendations made by economic theory. Strong creditor rights therefore seem to limit the opportunistic behavior of managers regarding the design of stock option programs.
The estimation results moreover show that the design of firms' stock option programs is cross-sectionally related to a company's growth opportunities (as proxied by Tobin's Q), business risk (as proxied by the standard deviation of the percentage change of operating income), and the past stock market return. Firms with higher growth opportunities and business risk have stock option programs that are on average worse designed.
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This finding might reflect that high volatility companies with many growth opportunities need to offer broad-based ESO programs that are likely to be in-the-money in order to attract high quality managerial talent. Core et al. (1999) provide a similar argument to interpret their finding that firms with higher investment opportunities pay higher CEO compensation.
The coefficient on the past stock return is negative and significant showing that firms with a high annual stock market return over the past five years have, ceteris paribus, better designed stock option plans. The coefficients on firm size (proxied by the log of total assets) and leverage turned out to be statistically insignificant.
In terms of overall performance of our econometric model, our regression results indicate that corporate governance variables together with the respective controls have significant power in explaining the observed variation in the design of stock option programs (pseudo R 2 of 16.34% and 15.84% 38 respectively, and Prob > χ 2 = 0.0000 for both models).
Overall, our result provide mixed evidence on the view hat poor governance schemes are generally associated with badly designed stock option programs. On the one hand, we find that ownership structures seem to be related to the ESO design in a way consistent with the managerial-power or rent-extraction view. The significant signs of the ownership variables that measure the influence of blockholders and the NYSE listing are consistent with the interpretation that when governance systems are weak, executives can extract rents by designing poor ESO programs. Further support for this view is provided by the finding that weaker creditor rights are associated with worse designed stock option plans.
37 For the business risk variable, this is, however, only the case for the ordered logit model, see Table 6 .
38 Note, that a pseudo R 2 of around 16% is relatively high for these kind of estimation models.
However, our findings also suggest that board variables do not seem to be related to the ESO design in a way that supports the arguments and predication of the managerial-power view. The variables that measure the percentage of outsiders on the board, conflicts of interests of the board chair when he also serves as the CEO and the age of the chairman turned out to be statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Moreover, the measure of board size is negatively related to the ESO Grade Index which is contrary to the view that larger boards provide more opportunities to managers to extract rents. It is also contrary to many recent governance findings suggesting that larger boards monitor less effectively. The finding on the relation between the mandates of a busy board chairman and the ESO design is also inconclusive.
Our null hypothesis saying that firms with weaker governance structures have worse designed stock option programs can therefore be accepted if we regard ownership structures.
However, we find no or even conflicting evidence if we consider the cross-sectional association between companies ESO design and their board structures.
Robustness Checks
We performed several checks to test the robustness of the results presented in the previous subsection. In particular, we studied whether our results are robust to the exclusion of the absolute performance target and whether the implicit under-weighting of the participation structure and transparency variable have an impact on our results.
We argued that an evaluation of the presence and design of absolute performance targets in ESO programs might not be justified from an agency theoretic point of view. We nevertheless used this design feature for our analysis because of the arguments presented in Subsection 3. In this chapter, we present regression results that were obtained when we excluded the absolute performance target in calculating the ESO Grade Index.
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The ESO Grade Index G j therefore now ranges between 4 and 16. Regression results for the ordered logit and ordered probit specification are presented in Table 7 . Again, the law and industry dummies and the number of blockholders that own more than 5% are not 39 The ESO Grade Index was therefore calculated on the basis of the following four subindexes. Relative Performance Target, Accounting, Participation Structure, and Transparency. Table 7 show that our results are robust to the inclusion/exclusion of a subindex that evaluates the absolute performance target.
Once again, the regression results show that firms that are listed at the New York Stock
Exchange employ stock option programs that are better designed. Moreover, we still find a negative and significant relation between our measure of the percentage of equity held by blockholders and the ESO Grade Index G j . We find further support that ineffective board structures do not seem be associated with badly designed ESO programs. The conclusions made in the previous subsections therefore hold even if we exclude the absolute performance target.
To account for the possibility that the implicit but deliberate under-weighting of the subindexes for Participation Structure and Transparency (each subindex ranges only from 1 to 3 while the other range from 1 to 5) has an impact on the results, we also performed regressions where all five indexes where measured on a one to five scale.
40
Again, we employed ordered response models using the same set of explanatory variables as in the previous sections. We find that our regression results (not reported here) do not change and are hence not sensitive to the fact that two subindexes are measured on a 1 to 3 scale only.
Conclusion
Active institutional investors and shareholder activists have sharply criticized various features of stock option programs. These groups argue that the design of many stock option programs is an example of managerial self-dealing and rent extraction and illustrates the inability of existing corporate governance mechanisms in monitoring executives. Even in the academic press, there is an increasing criticism saying that the escalation and design of stock option compensation reflects managerial rent seeking rather than optimal contracting (see Bebchuk and Fried, 2003 and Bebchuk et al., 2002 . Based on these critical views, we wanted to investigate whether there is an association between the design of employee stock option programs and the structure of a firm's corporate governance. We tried to explain the observed variation in the design of ESO programs with differences in firms' corporate governance schemes. Simply put, we wanted to examine whether firms with weak governance schemes have stock option programs that are poorly designed from an economic or agency theoretic point of view. To perform this task, data on European stock option programs provided a promising basis. Compared to stock option plans in the U.S., European stock option plans show a large variation and therefore provide a natural environment for an attempt to test the managerial power or rentseeking approach. We analyzed the association between the stock option program design and corporate governance structures using detailed data on the ESO programs of 80 corporations belonging to the DAX 30, the Euro Stoxx 50 and the Stoxx 50. Our main results can be summarized as follows. We found that cross-sectionally, ownership variables seem to be related to the ESO design in a way that is consistent with the managerial power or rent-extraction view. When ownership concentration is low and the exposition to the U.S. capital market little, executives can extract rents by designing poor ESO programs.
Further support for this view is provided by the finding that firms with weaker creditor rights more often have badly designed stock option plans. Our findings, however, also suggested that ineffective board structures do not seem to be associated with the stock option design in a way that supports the arguments and predication of the self-dealing view.
